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Abstract
This paper examines the nature of upstream rivalry in non-linear supply
contracts with and without exclusive dealing. We find that foreclosure can
occur without exclusive dealing, if economies of scale are sufficiently large, as
well as with exclusive dealing. Surprisingly, however, it is the retailer and
not the upstream firms who benefit. This formalizes the view that exclusive
dealing will not be initiated by suppliers because retailer compensation is too
steep. It also implies that anticompetitive foreclosure is more likely to occur
when downstream firms have bargaining power.
*We thank Steve Salop for encouraging us to examine the existence of equilibria with non-linear
supply contracts when multiple upstream firms sell through a common agent. This led us to address
many of the issues in the paper. We also thank Howard Marvel, and seminar participants at Ohio
State, the University of Michigan, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. General Accounting
Office. An earlier of version of this paper was titled "Rivalry in Nonlinear Supply Contracts: Does
Market Foreclosure Occur?"
I Introduction
Exclusive dealing is a contractual restraint that prohibits a retailer from selling the brands of more
than one competing manufacturer. Some view this restraint as an attempt by upstream firms either
to exclude their competitors outright, or to raise their costs by forcing them to seek less efficient
channels of distribution. Indeed, antitrust law has long been concerned with exclusive dealing as a
means of market foreclosure. Section 3 of the Clayton Act expressly prohibits it when its effect is
"substantially to lesson competition or to tend to create a monopoly". 1
Nevertheless, it is puzzling why a retailer would voluntarily agree to limit her product selections.
As Bork (1978) argues, a manufacturer would have to compensate the retailer to induce her to carry
his product exclusively. He posits that she would agree to it only if the gain to consumers from
the passed through lower retail price more than offsets the loss to consumers from the reduction
in product variety. Hence, he concludes that if we see exclusive dealing, it must be for efficiency
reasons.2
Recently, attempts have been made to formalize the foreclosure story. Mathewson and Win-
ter (1987) consider an asymmetrically differentiated upstream duopoly selling to a local retail
monopolist.3 In the absence of exclusive dealing, the two manufacturers compete by playing a
Nash game in wholesale prices. The retailer then acts as the agent for distribution. With exclusive
dealing, the dominant manufacturer offers a wholesale price low enough to ensure the retailer at
least as much profit as she could earn by buying from the excluded firm at cost. They find that
exclusive dealing can be privately profitable for the dominant firm. Nevertheless, even in a model
in which efficiency claims are conspicuously absent, their welfare analysis finds that foreclosure is
not always anticompetitive. The two offsetting effects are the gain to welfare from the likely lower
retail price of the included brand, and the loss to welfare from the reduction in product variety.
A different approach was taken by Aghion and Bolton (1987). They consider the incentives
of a single seller and buyer to sign a contract that reduces the likelihood of entry into the seller's
homogeneous product market. Surprisingly, they find that the incumbent seller and buyer will want
to commit to an exclusive dealing contract with a penalty escape clause, requiring the buyer to
pay damages to the incumbent if she switches to the entrant at some future date. The intuition is
that the penalty clause increases the buyer's opportunity cost of purchasing from the entrant and
hence permits greater surplus extraction. In the absence of uncertainty, the new firm enters with
zero profit. With uncertainty, the penalty may be set too high ex ante and entry that would have
increased welfare may be deterred.
One shortcoming of these papers is that neither allows for non-linear contracts to transfer surplus
1See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 3, 14 (1970). Landmark cases include Standard Fashion v. Magrane-Houston Co.
(258 U.S. 346 [1922]) and Standard Oil Co. v. U.S. (337 U.S. 293 [1949]).
2 For example, Marvel (1982) points out that promotional activities undertaken by a manufacturer to increase
demand for his product will be underprovided when they also generate customers for his rivals. Without exclusive
dealing, the problem is exacerbated if retailers can influence consumers to purchase the brands of rival manufacturers
from whom higher retail margins are earned.
3 5ee Comanor and Frech (1985) for an earlier attempt to model foreclosure with exclusive dealing. However,
Schwartz (1987) has criticized their work for falling to incorporate dealer rationality.
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between firms. Aghion and Bolton sidestep the issue by supposing that the buyer purchases at most
one unit from a single seller. But in general, with product differentiation and downward sloping
demands, non-linear contracts (e.g., quantity discounts) can affect the buyer's-opportunity cost of
purchasing from the entrant in the same manner as a penalty escape clause. Yet if there is no need
to include a penalty escape clause to transfer surplus, then it is not clear why exclusive dealing
would be needed either.
In their conclusion, Mathewson and Winter acknowledge that if non-linear contracts were fea-
sible, the dominant firm would not need to lower its wholesale price to obtain distribution. But
if the wholesale price is not lowered, one is left to wonder whether exclusive dealing for market
foreclosure purposes were always anticompetitive. Even if it were always anticompetitive, antitrust
policy makers would not have to be concerned if foreclosure turns out never to be privately prof-
itable. And if it is privately profitable, an open question is whether it can arise even in the absence
of exclusive dealing, perhaps through an upstream firm offering generous quantity discounts or
announcing a quantity forcing contract.
This paper examines market foreclosure when non-linear supply contracts are feasible. We first
consider the nature of rivalry in the absence of exclusive dealing. Because we place few restrictions
on the allowable set of supply contracts, it turns out that there exist multiple equilibria. However, in
each instance the retailer buys the efficient amount in the sense that transfer prices equal production
marginal cost at the equilibrium quantities. Equilibria differ as to whether foreclosure occurs and
in the division of surplus among the contracting parties.
We find that foreclosure is possible through non-linear contracts alone, but only if economies
of scale are large enough. By contrast, foreclosure through exclusive dealing can always arise in
equilibrium. Hence exclusive dealing need not be superfluous.
Curiously, the impetus for exclusive dealing must necessarily come from the retailer. Every
upstream firm is at least as well off in every equilibrium in which foreclosure does not occur as it
is in every equilibrium in which foreclosure does occur. This is so regardless of the distribution
of bargaining power among the participants. The intuition is that exclusive dealing or foreclosure
through non-linear contracting decreases the bilateral surplus of the included firm and retailer (by
lowering product variety) and also increases the retailer's disagreement point with each supplier.
On the other hand, the retailer may or may not prefer one-good equilibria. Although her share of
profit increases, this is offset by a shrinking overall surplus.
These findings do not support Bork's view that the retailer will serve as the consumer's agent,
as the retailer may coerce suppliers into adopting exclusive dealing even though it may be socially
undesirable. The model also lends credence to the view that retailers may purposely limit their
shelf space to increase bargaining leverage vis-a-vis their suppliers.
On the other hand, our findings broadly support Bork's insight that suppliers will not find
exclusive dealing for foreclosure purposes to be privately profitable because the cost of retailer
compensation is steep. By contrast, a recent paper by Rasmusen et al. (1991) found that when
economies of scale are important, exclusionary agreements can enable incumbent monopolists to
exclude their potential rivals cheaply. If each buyer believes that enough other (noncompeting)
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buyers will sign an exclusive dealing contract with the incumbent, then each will also believe that
entry will not be forthcoming. We differ from them by focusing on situations where buyers know
that all sellers are active competitors. We also differ by allowing product differentiation, so that in
the absence of exclusive dealing the retailer may wish to buy both products.
There is a small literature on non-linear contracting by multiple principals selling to a common
agent. One paper, Bernheim and Whinston (1986), distinguishes between delegated and intrinsic
agency. Under delegated agency, the agent can choose to sign contracts with a subset of principals.
Under intrinsic agency, the agent either does not participate or it must sign contracts with all of
the principals. Their analysis focuses on intrinsic agency. Bernheim and Whinston (1985) and
Katz (1989) consider delegated agency. They are concerned with when principals will choose to sell
through a common agent as opposed to selling through separate agents. Although they allow any
one agent to reject a principal's contract, their models are constructed so that the principals will
not be excluded from the market.4 This assumption is plausible whenever the market for agents is
competitive. However, in other contexts the assumption that upstream firms will not be excluded
from the market is better derived as a consequence of equilibrium.
There is also some related literature on oligopoly price discrimination. Spulber (1979) estab-
lishes the existence of equilibrium in a model where competing firms take their inverse demand as
given holding constant their rivals' prices. He does not model the buyer's optimization explicitly.
Calem and Spulber (1984) and DeMeza (1986) model competing firms offering two-part tariffs to
a representative consumer. The former derive equilibrium conditions without taking into account
the possibility of foreclosure. DeMeza correctly conjectures the existence of a two-good equilibrium
with two-part tariffs when the upstream firms have constant marginal costs. However, he does not
allow for more general supply contracts, nor does he consider more general cost functions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section ii presents the model and derives necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium. Section iii focuses on equilibria in which
exclusion does not occur. Section iv analyzes alternative means of market foreclosure. We first
consider exclusion through non-linear contracting. This is then contrasted with foreclosure through
exclusive dealing. Finally, we consider the incentives for exclusion through vertical integration.
Section v concludes the paper.
II The Model
Suppose there are two goods, X and Y, produced by firm X and firm Y respectively, which are
partial substitutes in the sense that an increase in the retail price of one leads to an increase in
consumer demand for the other. These goods are distributed to final consumers through local retail
monopolists, and the technology of distribution is such that neither producer is willing to enter
*Rejected firms in Bernheim and Whinston "in effect take their marketing decisions with them: perhaps they hire
another agent or make decisions independently." In Katz's model, two principals announce supply terms that each is
willing to offer a common dealer. After observing their rivals terms, each principal then announces whether it is still
willing to go with a common dealer. If not, then the principals simultaneously offer new supply terms to separate
dealers.
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the downstream market to sell only his good.5 Thus, it is imperative that upstream firms secure
retailer patronage.
A retailer will not sell good Y if her expected profit from doing so is negative. Incorporated
into this calculation is what her foregone profit would be from reduced sales of good X. This
foregone profit is determined by the exogenous degree of substitution between the goods, and by
the cost of good X to the retailer. Notice that if the upstream firms are restricted to charging linear
wholesale prices, then the retailer will sell both goods as long as retail prices can be found which
equal or exceed the individual wholesale prices and for which demands are non-zero. Allowing the
feasible supply contracts to include more general forms of quantity dependent pricing complicates
the analysis in two ways. First, the additional flexibility allows the upstream firms to extract local
retail surplus without distorting final goods prices. Second, both firms can choose their terms so as
to disadvantage their rival, possibly foreclosing it from any sales. We are primarily concerned with
this latter aspect of upstream rivalry. Hence, as in Mathewson and Winter, we purposely abstract
from the recognized efficiency motives for exclusive dealing.
The formal game is as follows. In stage one, firms X and Y simultaneously and independently
choose their supply contracts, T,(.) and T 1(-).
6 We place three restrictions on these contracts.
First, we assume that they are contingent only on own quantity.7 Second, if the retailer decides
not to purchase from a given firm, her payment to that firm is zero. Third, the payment asked for
any given quantity must not be less than the total cost of producing that quantity.8 In stage two,
the downstream firm chooses how much of each good to purchase. These amounts are then sold to
consumers. The equilibrium concept will be subgame perfection.
It is natural to ask in this setting why retailers who are local monopolists have no monopsony
power. One justification commonly made in the literature is to assume that each retailer accounts
for only a small fraction of the suppliers' wholesale market. Hence, the downstream firms are
thought to be contract takers. This may have corresponded to the situation in Standard Fashion v.
Magrane-Houston Co. where the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant sold to "hundreds,
if not thousands of communities in which there is a single retailer for the product ...". On the other
hand, this assumption is less plausible in the case when suppliers sell to a large supermarket chain.
Clearly, such retailers have bargaining power and often earn positive rent. Although we assume
the retailer is a contract taker, a surprising implication of our framework is that her profit will not
be driven to zero. Because of this, and because all of our other qualitative results continue to hold
in a Nash bargaining setting, we prefer to develop our insights with the more familiar take-it or
leave-it assumption. A sketch of the bargaining analysis is given in the appendix B.
Let R(X, Y) denote the downstream firm's revenue. The derived demand for good X is given
5This is descriptive of many consumer goods, where the degree of economies of scope achieved by spreading
overhead costs over multiple products is too high to warrant opening a single product outlet.
6This is the crucial difference between our paper and Rasmusen et al. In their paper buyers must form beliefs
about whether more than one seller will offer them a supply contract.
7Contracts contingent on the rival firms' quantity would arouse antitrust suspicion of collusion. Contracts contin-
gent on retall prices is a form of resale price malntenance, which is currently per-se illegal.
81t is easy to show that any ContraCt whiCh violates this assumption can be ruled out by iteratively eliminating
dominated strategies.
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by 8R/8X, and that for good Y is given by OR/8Y. We assume that both derived demands are
decreasing in own quantity, i.e., 8 2R/8X2 < 0 and 8 2R/8Y2 < 0. Goods X and Y may be strategic
substitutes or strategic complements. Formally, we define the goods as strategic substitutes if
8 2R/OXOY < 0, and strategic complements if 8 2R/8X8Y > 0.9 Distribution costs other than
the payment made for goods X and Y are assumed to be zero for simplicity. Thus, the retailer's
profit can be written as R(X, Y) - T ,(X) - T,(Y). Let C,(X) denote firm X's cost of producing
X units.10 We assume that C.,(-) is differentiable and increasing in X, and that C , (0) = 0. Denote
firm X's profit as T ,(X) - C ,(X). Define similar notation for firm Y.1
We shall now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for subgame perfect equilibrium con-
tracts. Define Q(T , (-),Ty(-)) = {(X,Y) E argmax2 ,, R(X,Y) - T ,(X) - T,(Y)}. For any vector
of contracts, the retailer's optimal stage two quantity pair(s) is contained in the set Q. In stage
one firms X and Y simultaneously choose the terms of their supply contracts taking as given the
retailer's optimal choices in f. Let (T(.),T(.)) be a pair of supply contracts that induce the
downstream firm to purchase (Xe,Y*) E O(Te(-),T"(-)). This yields profit for firm X and firm Y
of Tx(X*) - C , (X*) and T,*(Ye) - Cy(Ye) respectively. Let the retailer's maximized profit be given
by Hl,, = R(Xe, Y*) - Tx(X*) - T;(Ye). To examine the possibility of exclusion, it is convenient
to introduce notation for the retailer's profit if she were to sell only one good. Let the retailer's
profit be given by 11 = max, R(X, 0) - Tx(X) and liy = maxy R(0, Y) - Tx(Y) when that good is
X or Y respectively.
lemma 1 Tx(-) and Ty(-) arise in a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the following con-
ditions hold:
max R(X,Y) - C ,(X) - T*(Y) = R(Xe,Ye) - C,,(Xe) - T,*(Ye) (1)
maxR(X,Y) - C,(Y) - T (X) = R(Xe,Ye) - Cy(Ye) - T(Xe) (2)
XP/
,ll, = 11, = Hy(3)
Although the formal proof has been deferred to Appendix A, these conditions are quite intuitive.
Consider condition (1). The expression on the right hand side (RHS) of the equality represents the
bilateral profit (i.e., the sum of the profits) of the retailer and firm X evaluated at the equilibrium
quantities Xe, Ye. The equality with the left hand side (LHS) means that the equilibrium quantities
must maximize the bilateral profit of the retailer and firm X. Similarly, condition (2) means that the
equilibrium quantities must maximize the bilateral profit of the retailer and firm Y. The intuition
"The usual notion of strategic substitutes and complements pertains to single product firms. However, by explic-
itly writing out the expression for revenue for our multi-product downstream monopolist, it is seen that strategic
substitutes (complements) in the single product case imply strategic substitutes (complements) in the multi-product
case. The former yields downward sloping best response functions and is usually taken to be the normal case in a
quantity game. The latter yields upward sloping best response functions.
10This should be interpreted as the cost to X of supplying a particular local market, taking as given production
and sales in all other markets.
"1 This model could also be set up with the upstream firms selling directly to final consumers. What is crucial is
the common buyer assumption. Thus an equally good alternative specification involves a representative consumer
who has utility U(X, Y) + z, where z is the numeraire good. All of our results carry through.
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is that if bilateral profits were not maximized, then at least one of the suppliers could offer an
alternative contract that would increase his bilateral profit with the retailer, allowing both of their
profits to increase. Condition (3) will be interpreted below.
Notice that condition (1) implies Xe = arg max., R(X, Ye) - C., (X); therefore, either Xe = 0
or the derived demand for X equals X's marginal cost when evaluated at (Xe, Ye). Symmetrically,
condition (2) implies that either Y* = 0 or the derived demand for Y equals Y's marginal cost. In
other words, each producer endeavors to maximize the total surplus available from sales of his good,
taking the sales of the other good as fixed. We refer to (1) and (2) as the efficiency conditions.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, a supplier who succeeds in obtaining patronage will have in-
duced the retailer to purchase out to the quantity where her marginal revenue is equal to his pro-
duction marginal cost.
Let (XI, Y') E ?(C ,(-), Cy(-)) be the level of inputs that would be chosen by a vertically
integrated firm that could produce both goods at cost. The implication of the preceding paragraph
is that in any equilibrium where both goods are bought, Xe = XI and Ye = Y1 , and the joint
profits of the vertical structure are maximized. Similarly, let X m = arg max R(X, 0) - C , (X)
and Y m = arg max R(0, Y) - C,(Y). Then in any equilibrium where only good X is purchased,
Xe = Xm and Ye = 0, while in any equilibrium where only good Y is purchased, ye = Ym and
Xe = 0. Thus, in any one good equilibrium, the joint profits of the retailer and included firm are
maximized.
These results can be compared with the well known bilateral monopoly case in which non-linear
contracts are sufficient to avoid a double markup by the downstream firm. We have shown that
when an upstream duopoly sells to a single retailer, it is still the case that non-linear contracts
avoid double markups. This is true whether or not both goods are bought in equilibrium.
Condition (3) embodies two surplus extraction conditions. It says that in equilibrium the retailer
must be indifferent between buying both goods, good X only, or good Y only. In other words, each
supplier will extract his good's incremental contribution to the retailer's profit. If he attempts to
extract more, the retailer will not buy from him; if he were extracting less, he could offer a new
supply contract with a higher fixed component that would increase his profit.
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium, the retailer will necessarily earn positive profit.
This is surprising, yet if it were not true, then II,,, = II, = II = 0 = II + fIly - II,= 0, which
can easily be shown to contradict the definition of substitute goods.'"
Although the buyer's demand is known with certainty by both upstream firms, and fully ex-
tractive non-linear supply contracts are feasible, they do not arise. This is because the retailer's
opportunity cost of selling each good-viz., the reduction in demand for her substitute good-is
non-negative. This contrasts with the case of bilateral monopoly, where it is well known that a
1 2This finding has also been derived in similar contexts by Calem and Spulber (1984), who consider a duopoly
charging two-part tariffs to a representative consumer, and by Shafer (1991), who considers a multi-product upstream
monopolist charging two- part tariffs to a retail monopolist.
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take-it or leave-it supplier can employ a fixed fee to extract all of the buyer's surplus. The case
of multiple substitute goods differs because the price that consumers are willing to pay for a given
amount of one good will be less if another good is available than if one were not available. When
more than one good is sold, total revenue from the product class will be less than the sum of
the revenues if the same amount of each good were sold alone. Even if the retailer sells just one
good in equilibrium, she will still earn positive profit. Her bargaining strength is derived from her
opportunity cost of selling either good when the other good is available.
III Supply Contract Two-good Equilibria
The analysis in the previous section proved that the retailer will purchase the vertically integrated
quantities X, and YI in any equilibrium in which both goods are bought. By lemma 1, the necessary
and sufficient conditions for (Tx, T,) to be a two-good equilibrium pair of supply contracts are given
by conditions (1) - (3) with (X', Y') substituted for (Xe,Ye). The surplus extraction conditions
determine the payment that firms X and Y will receive from the retailer. Although they can easily
be satisfied by supply contracts which specify a fixed fee or equivalent, the amount that firm X can
collect will depend on the terms of firm Y's supply contract and vice versa. Intuitively, the more
advantageous are firm Y's supply terms to the retailer, the less inclined she will be to promote sales
of good X, and hence the less surplus there will be for firm X to extract.
The efficiency conditions can also be easily satisfied. If it is assumed that positive amounts
of both goods will be bought, then there are a variety of ways for both suppliers to design their
contracts to induce the retailer to purchase XI and Y1 respectively. One possibility is to ensure
that marginal transfers to the retailer are made at production marginal cost. A second possibility is
for firm X (Y) to write a quantity forcing contract which stipulates that the retailer must purchase
XI (Y'). Variants of the latter include minimum or maximum purchase requirements.
However, one must also check that both goods will, in fact, be purchased. That is, in a two-
good equilibrium, the LHS of the efficiency conditions must not be maximized at a corner solution.
Notice that condition (1) can be interpreted as saying that in any two-good equilibrium, a coalition
of firm X and the retailer will not wish to foreclose firm Y from the market. Therefore, the
maximum surplus available from selling good X only must be less than or equal to the surplus that
the coalition would earn from selling X and Y. Mathematically, it must be true that
R(X",0) -Cx(X m ) < R(XI,YI) - Cx(XI) - T(YI). (4)
Additional insight is gained by explicitly writing out firm Y's surplus extraction condition, H., =
Hl, ==> T*(Y') - R(X', Y') - Tj(X') - Hz, and then substituting it into (4) to get
A2, = T,*(X'I) - C , (X) )+ ll, - ( R(X", 0) - C , (X"m ));> 0. (5)
We refer to (5) as one of the non-foreclosure conditions.'3 If it were violated (and hence (4) were
violated) at a proposed equilibrium pair of contracts, firm X could simply offer to sell at cost plus a
13In addition to its analogue, the other two non-foreclosure conditions are that a coalition of firm X and the retailer
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fixed fee. This would induce the retailer to drop Y and choose the quantity X1. Bilateral surplus
would increase, so a fixed fee could be chosen to make both firm X and the retailer better off.
Using (5) and firm Y's surplus extraction condition, Y's profit in any two-good equilibrium can
be written as
Y's profit = R(X I,YI) - C,(X I) - Cy(YI) - (R(X m ,O) - C,(Xm )) - Ox.
Since A, ;> 0, we know that firm Y's profit is less than or equal to the total profit in the system
minus the profit that a coalition of firm X and the retailer could make if good Y were dropped.
This upper bound on profit is positive whenever a vertically integrated firm would choose YI > 0.
Whether or not firm Y can achieve this bound will depend on A2 , which in turn depends on the
contract that firm X offers the retailer.
Symmetrically, firm X's profit in a two-good equilibrium can be written as
X's profit = R(XI, Y') - C ,(XI) - Cy(Y') - (R(O,Ym ) - Cy(Y m )) - Ay.
The upper bound on profit will be positive whenever a vertically integrated firm would choose
XI > 0. Whether this bound is reached will depend on the contract that firm Y offers the retailer.
Consider the following proposed pair of equilibrium supply contracts for X and Y. Suppose both
upstream firms charged fixed fees (lump sum payments made at the time of ordering) and then
sold their good at cost. Let X's supply contract be such that
( 0 oifX=
T*(X) =10 ifX=(6)T(X)-C ,(X) + C , (X) if X > 0
Similarly, let Y's contract take the same form, where T'(XI) and Ty*(Y') simultaneously satisfy the
surplus extraction conditions. Substituting these supply contracts into the efficiency conditions, it
is easily verified that if there is an interior solution to the maximizations, then XI and YI will
be the retailer's choice of inputs. Intuitively, once the downstream firm pays a franchise fee of
TT(XI) - C(XI) to firm X and T,*(Y') - Cy(Y') to firm Y, she becomes the residual claimant to
profits. Her choices will be identical to a vertically integrated firm. It remains to check, however,
that the efficiency conditions are not maximized at the boundaries, i.e., that the non-foreclosure
condition (5) and its analogue are satisfied. Clearly, this depends on the size of the franchise fees.
Given the supply contract in (6), it is possible to compute the retailer's maximized profit if she
were to drop good Y. We have
II, = maxR(X,0) - T'(X)
= max R(X, 0) -C ,(X ) - (Ti(X') - C , (X'))
= R(X"',0) - C , ( X") - (T j( X') - C , ( X'))
will not foreclose firm X from the market, and that a coalition of firm Y and the retailer will not foreclose firm Y
from the market. One can show that both of these conditions will be satisfied provided that firm X and firm Y earn
non-negative profit in equilibrium. This is true by assumption since we assurned that the payment asked for any
given quantity must not be less than the total cost of producing that quantity.
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The first equality follows from the definition of HII. The second equality is obtained by substituting
in for the supply contract in (6). The third equality follows from by the definition of X"m . When the
last expression for H, is substituted into the non-foreclosure condition (5) the LHS becomes zero.
Similarly, given firm Y's supply contract, the analogous non-foreclosure condition is also satisfied
with equality. This means that both upstream firms achieve their upper profit bounds.
Proposition 3 Two-good equilibria always exist when supply contracts specify fixed fees with the
option to buy at cost. Furthermore, the upstream firms obtain their upper bounds on profits.
Since the total profit pie is fixed in any two-good equilibrium, it is clear that the retailer is better
off when suppliers do not achieve their upper bounds on profit. This suggests that the retailer will
have strong preferences over the nature of the supply contracts she receives. For example, suppose
firm Y's contract remained unchanged, but firm X offered a two-part tariff contract of the form
Tx*(X) _= 0i(7)=T(X')-wl+w VdX>v>o
where Tx(XI) and T,*(Y') are chosen to simultaneously satisfy the surplus extraction conditions,
and the wholesale price wx is equal to firm X's production marginal cost when evaluated at XI. The
fixed fee is Tx(XI) - wxXI. 14 Substituting these supply contracts into the efficiency conditions, it
is easily verified that if there is an interior solution to the maximizations, then XI and YI will be
the retailer's choice of inputs. It remains to check for boundary solutions.
Let Xt E arg max R(X, 0) - T(X). Then the non- foreclosure condition (5) is satisfied if and
only if Tx(XI) - Cx(XI) + R(Xt, 0) - Tj(Xt) - (R(Xm ,0) - Cx(X')) > 0. Substituting in the
two-part tariff contract in (7) and rearranging gives the non-foreclosure condition as
Ax = J 9RC O ) -w  x)ds+ J-(Ohs)- x)ds>0. (8)
The easiest case to consider is when firm X's production marginal cost is constant. Then
Xt = X" , wx = OCx/OX, and (8) is satisfied with equality. Firm Y achieves its upper profit
bound.
Next, consider the cases where production marginal costs are not constant. This can be illus-
trated with the help of figures 1-2. Figure 1 (2) depicts increasing (decreasing) production marginal
costs. Both illustrate strategic substitutes, which are represented graphically as a shifting out of
derived demand as Y falls from Y' to 0.1 The initial starting point has been labeled "A" in each
figure. Here, the retailer's derived demand for X is equal to X's production marginal cost.
[Insert figures 1 and 2]
When production marginal costs are increasing and the goods are strategic substitutes (see
Figure 1), the left hand side of (8) is strictly positive and is given by the area ABC. This means
"Notice that at X = X', firm X is indifferent between this contract and the one in (6).
1 5The analysis with strategic complements is similar and does not yield any insights beyond figures 1 and 2.
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that if firm X offers a two-part tariff contract, 0, = ABC > 0, and hence firm Y will not achieve
its upper profit bound.
For any given supply contract by firm Y, firm X's profit is determinate. Thus, firm X is
indifferent between a variety of contract forms. However, the retailer does have a preference. Her
threat to foreclose good Y is more credible when she can purchase additional units beyond XI at
a linear wholesale price as opposed to an increasing tariff that reflects rising marginal cost. Hence,
in order to secure the buyer's patronage, firm Y will not be able to extract as much surplus under
X's two-part tariff as it would if firm X were selling its units at cost.
It is easy to see that under more generous quantity discounts the retailer's opportunity cost of
selling both goods as opposed to one good would be even greater, and thus her equilibrium profit
would be higher. Let X's supply contract be such that
Te(X) =10if X =O(9
x( T(XI) - fx,(Xr) + fx(X) VX > 0 (9)
where the discount function f, has the properties OR(X, Y')/8X <49f,(X)/8X < 0 VX > 0, and
fx(X) induces the retailer to purchase X, when YI is also chosen. Let Xd be the amount the
retailer would purchase if she dropped good Y when offered the quantity discount in (9). Then
referring to figure 1, the left hand side of (5) is strictly positive and is given by the area ABD. Since
this area exceeds ABC, firm Y will necessarily be extracting even less surplus from the retailer given
firm X's quantity discount schedule than it would extract if firm X were to specify the two-part
tariff contract in (7).16 This is so because firm X's discount makes the option of dropping good Y
more valuable to the retailer, thus strengthening her threat vis- a-vis firm Y. Obviously, the greater
the discount that firm X offers, the worse off firm Y will be, and vice versa. The retailer stands to
gain from this type of competitive rivalry.
Now consider figure 2. With a two-part tariff the non-foreclosure condition (8) is strictly
negative and is given by area ABC. But this cannot be an equilibrium because a coalition of firm
X and the retailer will be able to find a profitable deviation that excludes good Y from the market
and permits both to earn higher profit. Intuitively, the retailer's option to foreclose good Y is
less valuable under a two- part tariff contract with decreasing production marginal costs than is
actually the case from the coalition's standpoint. Thus, two-good equilibria will not exist with
two-part tariffs when marginal costs are decreasing. On the other hand, a more generous quantity
discount schedule, which induces Xd > Xm, does yield an equilibrium because the non-foreclosure
condition (5) is non-negative and is given by area ABD. When firm X offers a contract such that
Xd > Xm, firm Y will not achieve his upper bound on profit.
The main insights of this section are that two-good equilibria always exist and that the division
of surplus will vary depending on the retailer's opportunity cost of selling each good. In particular,
profit is transferred from the upstream firms to the retailer according to the following proposition.
1
6 This is true even though the quantity discounts are unused in the sense that in equilibrium the retailer purchases
too little of good X to benefit directly from firrn X's increasingly generous quantity discount.
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Proposition 4 The retailer's equilibrium profit will be increasing in the size of the quantity dis-
counts offered by firm X and Y.
The results of this section will be used in comparing two- good equilibria with one-good equilibria
from the perspective of each firm.
IV Market Foreclosure and One-good Equilibria
In this section we begin by considering whether non-linear supply contracts can give rise to equilibria
in which the retailer purchases only one good. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm Y
is the excluded firm. We then consider equilibria that arise when the contract set is expanded to
include exclusive dealing provisions. Finally, we address whether firm X would want to foreclose
firm Y by vertically integrating with the retailer.
IV.1 Foreclosure through Non-linear Supply Contracts
The analysis in section ii proved that the retailer will purchase X m and 0 in any equilibrium in
which only good X is bought. By lemma 1, this gives the following three conditions as necessary
and sufficient for (T , T,) to be an equilibrium pair of supply contracts:
max R(X,Y) - Cx(X) - T (Y) = R(X m ,0) - CC(X m ) (10)
max R(X, Y) - C,(Y) - Tx(X) = R(Xm ,0) - Tx(X m ) (11)
R(X m ,0) - T(X m ) = max R(O, Y) - T(Y) (12)
From (11), it must be the case that a coalition of firm Y and the retailer will not foreclose firm
X from the market. Mathematically, R(0,Ym ) - Cy(Y m ) < R(Xm, 0) - Tx(X m ). Hence, firm X
will necessarily be the more profitable stand alone brand.
Proposition 5 With asymmetry of cost and demand, only the stronger brand, i.e., the most prof-
itable, can emerge as the included firm in a one-good equilibrium. Only with symmetry would it be
possible to have one good-equilibria in which either good is purchased.
Profit for the included firm X can be found from rearranging condition (12). It is equal to the
maximized coalition profit R(X m, 0) - Cx(X m ) minus the amount the retailer would earn by selling
good Y only. It can be easily verified that firm Y must specify a contract that allows the retailer
to buy Y m at cost, and hence this latter amount is equal to R(0, Y"') - C,(Y"m ). Intuitively, if
this were not true, then firm X would be induced to extract too much surplus. By reoptimizing, a
coalition between firm Y and the retailer would find it profitable to drop good X.
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Proposition 6 In any equilibrium in which only good X is purchased, profits for firm X, farm Y,
and the retailer are given by
X's profit = R(Xm ,0) - C.(Xm ) - (R(O,Ym ) - Cy(Y m ))
Y's profit = 0
Retailer's profit = R(o,Ym) - Cy(Y m ).
This division of surplus is unique for any one-good equilibrium regardless of the supporting
supply contracts. Firm X obtains exclusive distribution at substantial cost because the retailer
must earn at least as much profit as she would earn by selling good Y only. The more symmetric
are goods X and Y, the lower firm X's profit will be. The retailer always earns the monopoly profit
on the excluded good.
It remains to show that a pair of supply contracts can be constructed which satisfy the necessary
and sufficient conditions above. From (11), it must be the case that the value of Y which maximizes
R(X m , Y) - C,(Y) is equal to zero. Clearly, this will depend on the parameters of cost and demand.
If this is satisfied, then one-good equilibria will exist, since Tx(-) can always be chosen to be a
quantity forcing contract.1 7
Proposition 7 Foreclosure through non-linear supply contracts is feasible if and only if the derived
demand for good Y, when evaluated at Xm, is everywhere below Y's average cost.
This condition is more likely to be satisfied when scale economies are large. It will not be
satisfied, for example, if marginal costs are constant and there are no fixed costs associated with
selling to the retailer, or if fixed costs are sufficiently low and variable costs are convex. Thus, for
a wide range of cases, foreclosure can only occur through other means of contracting. We consider
exclusive dealing and vertical mergers below.
IV.2 Exclusive Dealing
Up to now, we have considered supply contracts that depend only on quantity. In practice, firms
can choose to foreclose a rival directly through exclusive dealing. That is, if the retailer sells good
X, and firm X has an exclusive dealing provision, then the retailer would be legally prohibited from
also selling good Y. This subsection compares explicit foreclosure through exclusive dealing to the
one and two-good equilibria in non-linear supply contracts.
We consider two ways to model the incorporation of exclusive dealing contractual provisions:
these decisions can be made prior to the choice of payment terms, or simultaneously with the rest
of the contract terms. Beginning with the former, the game is played as follows. In stage one,
the upstream firms simultaneously, but independently, decide whether to adopt exclusive dealing.
In stage two, the upstream firms offer supply contracts, and in stage three, the retailer chooses
17Let Tj(X) = R(Xm , 0) - R(0, Y"n) - Cs(Ym) if X = X m, 0 if X = 0, and oo otherwise. Let T*(Y m ) = C,(Ym )
if Y = Yin, 0 if Y = 0, and oo otherwise. It can be verified that these conditions satisfy the necessary and sufficient
conditions.
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how much of each good to purchase. At each stage, all information is common knowledge. The
equilibrium concept is subgame perfection.
There are four possible subgames after stage 1. One subgame extends from the decision by both
firms to forego exclusive dealing. This has already been analyzed. The other three subgames are
equivalent and arise regardless of whom adopts the restraint. Without loss of generality, let firm X
be the stronger brand in the sense that its stand-alone maximum profit exceeds that of firm Y. We
now consider under what conditions, if any, firm X or firm Y will choose to initiate an exclusive
dealing subgame.
Consider the exclusive dealing subgames. Many of the results found in the preceding subsection
on foreclosure through non-linear supply contracts extend trivially. For example, it will still be true
that in any equilibrium, surplus will be extracted until the retailer is just indifferent between buying
good X or good Y. Therefore, llx = IIy. Although conditions (10) and (11), which were necessary
and sufficient for a one- good equilibrium without exclusive dealing, have to be modified, the
replacement condition, R(0, Ym) - Cy(Y m ) < R(X m , 0) - T"(X m ), has already been considered.18
Recall that this inequality must hold if good Y is to be excluded from the market. In equilibrium,
we know that firm Y must offer a contract that allows the retailer to buy Ym at cost; hence firm
profits are given as in proposition 6.
The next step is to compare the upstream firms' profits with and without exclusive dealing.
Clearly, firm Y will be at least as well off in any two-good equilibria as it would be if it were
foreclosed. Surprisingly, firm X would also prefer to be in a two-good equilibrium. To see this, let
firm X's equilibrium profit with exclusive dealing be denoted by jHED. Then, from proposition 6,
HED = R(Xm ,0) - Cr(Xm) - (R(0,Ym ) - Cy(Ym )).
Let firm X's profit without exclusive dealing be denoted by IINED. Then, from firm X's surplus
extraction condition, profit in a two-good equilibrium can be written as
iINED = R(X',Y') -Cz(XI) - T*(Y') -UE31.
Subtracting IIED from IINED yields
[R(x',Y') - CC(XI) - T "(Y') - (R(Xm ,O) - CC(Xm )) + [R(0,Ym) - C (Ym ) - II|]> 0
Although the profit that firm X obtains in any two-good equilibrium can vary substantially, it will
always be at least as much as what it would obtain in a one-good equilibrium. There are two
reasons. The first set of terms in brackets represents the increase in surplus to the coalition of
firm X and the retailer when good Y is sold in addition to good X. It is non-negative. The second
set of terms in brackets represents the increase in the opportunity cost of the retailer when she is
committed to sell at most one brand as opposed to when she can only threaten to sell just one brand.
It is also non-negative. Both effects serve to make firm X better off in a two-good equilibrium.
1*Condition (10) is trivially true under exclusive dealing, since a coalition of firm X and the retailer does not have
the option of selling both good X and good Y. Sirmilarly, condition (11) reduces to the inequality in the text, because
a coalition of firrn Y and the retailer does not have the option of selling both goods.
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On the other hand, the retailer's profit in any equilibrium is determined by her opportunity cost
of selling good X, and since this is highest when firm Y offers her a supply contract at cost, the
retailer will prefer one-good equilibria. This yields the following proposition from which it follows
that neither upstream firm will initiate exclusive dealing in the three stage game.19
Proposition 8 Both suppliers are at least as well off in all two-good equilibria as they are in all
one-good equilibria. The retailer is always better off in a one-good equilibrium than it is in any
two-good equilibrium.
It should be pointed out that the retailer's preference for one-good equilibria is not robust to the
take-it or leave- it offer assumption. More generally, if the retailer has some bargaining power, her
profit will depend both on the total surplus available as well as on her disagreement point vis a vis
each supplier, i.e. her opportunity cost of selling each good. When comparing one-good equilibria
with two-good equilibria, we know that the overall surplus is higher in the latter, but that her
disagreement points are lower. In the polar case where the retailer has all of the bargaining power,
only the size of the total surplus matters; the retailer would prefer two- good equilibria. At the
other extreme, when the upstream firms can make take-it or leave-it offers, only the disagreement
points matter and the proposition holds.
The second way to model exclusive dealing is to assume that these decisions are made simultane-
ously with the rest of the contract terms. The formal game is as follows. In stage one, the upstream
firms simultaneously choose their supply contracts, which includes their non-linear payment terms
and their exclusive dealing decisions. The retailer purchases X and Y in stage two.
Because the contract set has been expanded to include exclusive dealing, the first task is to
consider whether the two-good equilibria found in the previous section are robust. Without loss
of generality, let firm X deviate from a proposed two-good equilibrium by offering a new supply
contract with exclusive dealing.
Holding firm Y's supply contract constant at Ty*, any alternative supply contract by firm X
must give the retailer at least II,. Thus, the maximum profit that firm X can earn under an
alternative contract with exclusive dealing is H* = R(Xm , 0) - Cx(X m ) - II,. Comparing profits
gives 1 1NED > II*. Therefore, firm X cannot deviate so as to earn strictly higher profit and hence
two-good equilibria are robust to the modification of the game.
The second task is to consider whether the one-good equilibria found in the previous subsec-
tion are robust. However, this is trivially so. Market foreclosure that arises through non-linear
contracting is unaffected by whether firm X or Y decides to adopt exclusive dealing in addition to
their other terms. On the other hand, exclusive dealing allows one-good equilibria to be supported
even when firm Y's derived demand is everywhere above Y's average cost.
The analysis in this section has shown that there is a role for exclusive dealing even when non-
linear supply contracts are feasible. This is because explicit foreclosure is always possible whereas
foreclosure through non-linear supply contracts is not, and because the division of surplus is the
same in all one-good equilibria. However, we have shown that the manufacturers themselves do
"I1t is weakly dominated for either firm to announce exclusive dealing.
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not have incentives to foreclose their rivals, and that it is the retailers who may sometimes prefer
the one-good equilibria because of the added bargaining strength it gives them.
IV.3 Vertical Mergers
Market foreclosure can also occur when an upstream firm merges with a downstream firm and
refuses to carry the products of its competitors. This solution to the problem is drastic and would
seem to be unnecessary if contractual foreclosure is possible. Nevertheless, vertical mergers can
easily be accommodated in our framework.
Consider the bilateral profit of firm X and the retailer in the absence of a merger. In any
two-good equilibrium, this profit is given by R(XI, Y') - T (Y') - C.(XI). On the other hand,
the maximized bilateral profit of firm X and the retailer after a merger is R(X m ,0) - C.(X m ) if
firm Y is excluded. Clearly, market foreclosure is not profitable. Furthermore, in the context of
our model, vertical separation is a weak best response by a coalition of firm X and the retailer. A
vertical merger is undesirable because firm Y would then be able to achieve its upper profit bound.
By remaining separated, the retailer may be able to negotiate a quantity discount with firm X that
can extract additional surplus from Y, without making firm X any worse off.
V Conclusion
An important issue when suppliers sell to commercial buyers is how the surplus from sales to final
consumers will be shared. Many authors resolve this by focusing their attention on supply contracts
with linear wholesale prices. Such a restriction is, however, inefficient. It leads to the well known
double marginalization problem whereby both upstream and downstream firms markup over cost.
The end result is a retail price which is too high in the sense that joint profits are not maximized.
Non-linear contracting can avoid this problem, and moreover, is frequently observed in intermediate
goods markets.
Nevertheless, nearly all of the formal exclusive dealing literature takes linear wholesale pricing
as the benchmark.20 It then considers whether the restraint can arise for anticompetitive reasons.
The difficulty with this approach is that it mixes the foreclosure motives of suppliers with their
desire to extract additional surplus from retailers. It also does not consider the possibility that
foreclosure can arise through non-linear contracting directly without the need to specify exclusivity
in the contract. We believe that policy informed by these models can be misguided.
This paper places few restrictions on the type of non-linear supply contracts that are allowed.
We do find that foreclosure can occur without exclusive dealing, but only if economies of scale are
sufficiently large. Hence exclusive dealing is necessary for foreclosure to occur in many cases.
A surprising result is that when the foreclosure and surplus extraction motives of suppliers
are disentangled, suppliers never want to foreclose their rivals. The intuition is that the restraint
20 Lin (1990) considers two-part tariffs. However, in the absence of exclusive dealing, the retailer in his model is
necessarily assumed to carry both brands. This leads him to conclude, in violation of our propositions 1 and 2, that
transfer prices will not equal marginal cost and that the retailer's surplus will be zero.
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decreases the total surplus available (by lowering product variety) and serves to raise the retailer's
bargaining power by increasing her opportunity cost of buying each good. By contrast, we find
that it is the retailer who may desire exclusive dealing. Her share of profit increases in a one-good
equilibrium, but this must be balanced against a shrinking overall surplus. In the polar case where
she has all of the bargaining power, the total size of the surplus dominates. She prefers two-good
equilibria. When her bargaining power is determined solely by her opportunity cost of selling each
brand, the size of the total surplus is irrelevant to her. Although she prefers exclusive dealing, it
is not likely that suppliers will acquiesce. Thus, we expect to see exclusive dealing for foreclosure
purposes only when bargaining power is more even and only at the initiation of the retailer.
Some comments should be made on the welfare effects of foreclosure in our model. Fortunately,
this can be done by analogy to the literature on monopoly and product diversity. There, it is
known that a monopolist may have too much or too little social incentive to introduce a second
product.2 ' Here, the problem is isomorphic because the retailer's product choice in the absence
of foreclosure is the same as a vertically integrated monopolist. Hence, it cannot be determined
apriori whether welfare is higher or lower with one good or two good equilibria. By analogy with the
product diversity literature, we know that it is likely to be higher when demand can be represented
spatially, and likely to be lower when demand is derived from a representative consumer.
Much work remains to be done, and so our policy conclusions are necessarily tentative. We
agree with Mathewson and Winter that foreclosure can arise but that its welfare implications are
ambiguous. However, we do not see an easy way to distinguish when more product variety is
desirable. For this reason, we would find against exclusive dealing if the restraint is adopted to
foreclose markets. The difficulty, of course, is in determining when exclusive dealing is used for
efficiency reasons and when it is used for foreclosure purposes. In our view we have provided a
formal justification for why policy makers should not jump to the conclusion that exclusionary
agreements are for anticompetitive foreclosure. The cost of retailer compensation is simply too
steep. On the other hand we would be concerned when exclusive dealing arises in markets where
the retailer has some bargaining power.22
One direction for future research is to extend the Aghion and Bolton model to differentiated
products with downward sloping demands. We conjecture, based on the results of this paper,
that an optimal contract between the incumbent seller and buyer would specify quantity discounts
without an exclusive dealing clause. This would suffice to extract extra surplus from the potential
entrant without necessarily foreclosing it from the market. A second direction for research is to
allow for competing downstream firms. Here, a crucial distinction needs to be made regarding
contract observability. If the downstream firms cannot observe each other's supply contracts, then
the qualitative results of this paper are unchanged. However, the nature of competition when
multiple principals sell to multiple agents and non-linear contracts are observable and feasible is
an open question.
2 1The opposing factors are the inability to capture all of the consumer surplus generated by the second product
versus the more effective segmentation of consumers. See de Meza and Ungern-Sternberg (1982).
22In private conversation we have learned that a retail chain in the northeast may have pressured suppliers of some
products into an implicit exclusive arrangement.
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Appendix A
Necessity. The proof is by contradiction. Consider first the necessity of condition (3). By definition,
ll,, ;> l, H,. Suppose one of the inequalities were strict. Then the supplier who is not extracting
all his incremental profit could increase his profit by raising the fixed component of his supply
contract. Next, consider the necessity of (1). Suppose T'(.) and Tye(.) arise in a subgame perfect
equilibrium, but that max,,, R(X, Y) - Cx(X) - T,*(Y) # R(Xe, Ye) - Cx(X*) - T,*(Ye). Using
the fact that ll, = ll,, this can be written as
max R(X,Y) - C,(X) - T(Y) - T,(X') + C,(Xe) $ H. (13)
x,Y
If the left hand side of (13) were less than the right hand side, the retailer would earn less by buying
X* and ye than by buying only good Y, a contradiction. Suppose the left hand side were greater
than the right hand side. Then for some arbitrarily small w,
max R(X,Y) - C,(X) - T,*(Y) - T,*(X*) + C,(X*e) - w > ll,. (14)
X,Y
But consider the supply contract
Jo if X =0O,
T,*(X) = Tx(X*) + Cx(X) - C,(X*) + w otherwise.
Substituting this contract into (14) gives
max R(X, Y) - T,*(X) - T,*(Y) > Il,,
x,Y
which means that under T* the retailer would purchase a positive amount. Hence, supplier X
would earn w more in profit under T,*(-) than under Tj(-), contradicting the hypothesis that T(.)
was a best response to Ty*(-). The necessity of condition (2) is established symmetrically.
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Sufficiency. Suppose that conditions (1) through (3) hold, but that Tx"(-) and Ty"(-) do not arise in
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Then at least one of the suppliers can offer a contract that would
increase his profit. Without loss of generality, suppose 3 T,(-) that would induce the retailer to
choose X > 0 and would make firm X better off. That is,
maxlR(X, Y) - T(X) - T,"(Y) > II,, (15)
X,Y
and T,(X) > Te(X*) - Cx(Xe) + C(X) V(X,Y) E Q(T('),Ty(-)). Without loss of generality,
let (X, Y) E Q(T(-), Ty*(.)) be the retailer's choice of (X, Y). There exists some 'ir> 0 such that
T,(X) = Tx(X*) - CC(Xe) + Cx(X) + i. Substituting this expression into (1), and using the fact
that ll,, = II,, yields
max R(X,Y) - C,(X) - T,(Y) - Tx(X) + C,(X) + w = ll,. (16)
X,Y
Evaluating the left hand side of (16) at (X, Y), we have
R(X,Y) - TA*(Y) - 7x(X) +W < Ily,
which means that
R(X, Y) - T,*(Y) - T(X) < II,. (17)
But by the definition of (X, Y), condition (17) contradicts condition (15). Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
This appendix shows that the qualitative results of the paper are unchanged when the retailer
bargains with the upstream firms. Following Harsanyi (1977) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988),
suppose the retailer is simultaneously engaged in bilateral monopoly relations with each supplier.
A bargaining equilibrium is defined as a set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions between
the retailer and each supplier. Let the profits of the retailer and supplier X be given by 4,. =
R(X, Y)-Tx(X)-TT(Y) and #, = T(X)-C,(X) where (X, Y) E £(T,(), T,(-)). Their bargaining
problem is defined by the disagreement points (Hy,0) and the convex set of payoff pairs <, =
{or, 4x | (X, Y) E O(T,(-), Ty(.))}. A set of asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions is a vector of
contracts that maximize the Nash products, (4, - Hl5)(1a ;) (q5_)"s(i = X, Y; i $ j), where as E (0,1)
is a measure of the bargaining power of supplier i in negotiations with the retailer. Let T,(.) be
the bargaining equilibrium contract between the retailer and supplier Y. Then notice that the Nash
product between the retailer and supplier X can be rewritten as
(R(x,Y) - Cx(X) - T,"(Y) - X's profit - II,) (X's profit)" .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that Tx(-) consists of a non-linear payment schedule
t,(.) and a fixed fee Fx. Given component Tx, choosing F, is equivalent to choosing X's profit.
From the first order condition we have
X's profit = ax (R(x,Y) - C,(X) - T,"(Y) - ll). (18)
Substituting this into the Nash product, yields
(1 - ax)'-"(ax)ax (R(x,Y) - C,(X) - T,(Y) - 1ig.
Since Ye maximizes R(Xe, Y) - T,*(Y), and since the supplier and retailer X can always write a
forcing contract that induces the retailer to choose any X, the remaining part of their problem is
equivalent to
max R(X,Y) - C,(X) - Ty(Y) = R(X*, Ye) - Cx(Xe) - T(Ye). (19)x,y
A similar maximization problem determines the Nash bargaining solution between the retailer
and supplier Y. Conditions (18) and (19) and their analogues are necessary and sufficient for
(x*, Ye, T*(-), T,"(-)) to arise in a bargaining equilibrium.
Notice that (18), (19), and their analogues are qualitatively similar to the conditions in propo-
sition 1. The only difference is that supplier profits under bargaining differ from supplier profits
in the text by a factor of a;. It is easy to see that with the exception of proposition 8, all of our
previous results continue to hold. Proposition 8 differs because under bargaining the retailer may
or may not earn higher profit under exclusive dealing. The intuition was discussed in the text.
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